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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of tl1e
STATE OF UTAH
CAROL EWAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vsIL·\ Y BUTTERS,

Case No.
10086

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries .arising
out of an automobile-pedestrian accident that occurred November 21, 1962, at approximately 9th
~orth and Beck Street in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake

County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.· At the conclusion
of plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to dismiss
the action upon the ground that plaintiff (pedestrian) was guilty of negligence as a m·atter of law.
This motion was granted by the .court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ..
.
. Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment .and
that the case be remanded for trial.
.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Those facts cited in Appellant's Brief are substantially correct. However, other facts in the record
must be set forth to give a clear and complete picture
of the events .and circumstances surrounding this
accident.
The accident occurred November 21, 1962, at
approximately 7:00 P.M. (R. 44). It occurred on
Beck Street at approximately Ninth North in Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Beck Street is
a continuation of Second West Street in Salt Lake
City and is the m.ain highway northbound from Salt
Lake City, Utah. The accident in question occurred
approximately 1195 feet south of the intersection
of Beck Street and Victory Road. Beck Street at the
point of this accident trends generally north and
south (Ex. 1 ) . It consisted at this time of six lanes
for moving traffic (three northbound and three
south·bound) plus an island dividing northbound and
southbound traffic which at that time was delineated
by solid painted lines. The overall width of the
highway including the island was 105 feet 5 inches.
The distinguishing landmark in the area where the
accident occurred is a "M.ars" Service Station, which
sits on the east side of Beck Street (Ex. 1).
The accident between plaintiff and the vehicle
operated by defendant occurred at a point in front
of the southerly driveway or entrance to the "Mars"
Station in the outside or easterly of the three northbound traffic lanes (Ex. 1, R. 46-47).
2
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Since the only question before the court is whether plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, an
analysis of plaintiff's testimony concerning her conduct immediately before the accident is essential, and
this testimony will be explored in detail.
Plaintiff left her home at 524 East 1st South,
on ~ovember 21, 1962, between 6:30 and 6:45 P.M.
( R. 40, 44). She was to visit a prospective customer
for the purpose of demonstrating a "Relax.acizor",
which she sold on a part time basis ·( R. 42) . Her
appointment was on Duluth Street, which she believed to be in the vicinity of north Beck Street (R.
44).
Plaintiff traveled west from her home to Second
\Vest Street and then north along Second West
Street past the S~. Mark's Hospital at Seventh
North .and continued north to approximately the
point where Victory Road intersects with Beck
Street (R. 45). As plaintiff was proceeding she had
noticed a street on the west side of Beck Street that
said ''Beck Street". She turned around in the vicinity of Covey's Service Station and headed back south
on Beck Street to check this street sign. As she
reached this street, she turned west and discovered
that it was not a street ( R. 45). Mter proceeding
west about one hundred feet, her vehicle became
stuck in mud ( R. 45-46) .
She walked back up to Beck Street and noticed
the "~Iars" Service Station, which was slightly north
of her position on the east side of Beck Street (R.
3
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46). She intended to go to the "Mars" Station to
obtain assistance in removing her car from the mud.
She then walked north to a point on the west side of
Beck Street directly opposite the south driveway of
the "Mars" Station (R. 46).
Plaintiff then looked to the north for traffic
and observed none. She then looked to the south and
observed two pairs of car headlights approximately
two blocks away in the vicinity of the Warm Springs
Plunge ( R. 46) going at a slow speed. She estimated
their speed at twenty miles per hour (R. 47).
Plaintiff then testified on direct examination to
the following events:
"Q. Now would you tell the jury what
you saw to the left?
A. As I looked to the north towards
Ogden?
Q. Yes.
A. No traffic whatsoever.
Q. And you have already told the jury
what you saw to the right, or to the south?
A. Right.
Q. And what did you do upon making
this observation?
A. Started to cross. It was n1y only
way to cross.
Q. And in what direction did you travel,
or how did you cross the street? ·
A. Almost straight.
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. To what point?
A. To the beginning of the driveway of
the Mars Service Station.
Q. And what direction would that be to
point "A"?
A. Well, isn't point "A" the end of the
driveway? Is this the end of the driveway?
Q. This is a curb and this is the first
entrance.
A. Well, to the first entrance.
THE COURT: Well, were you going
fron1 west to east?
A. From west to east, yes. Yes, I was.
Q. To point "A" is that where you were
going?.
A. Yes sir.
Q. What was the next sensation after
- did you get across the street? Let me ask
you that.
A. I viewed what I have already explained; decided there was no problem at all;
started walking across the street and the last
I ren1ember was plain walking with absolutely no problem, no danger to myself. And the
next thing I remember I was in the middle of
the street with somebody holding my head.
Q. Do you remember how far across the
street that you got?
A. I had only - almost crossed the
street, and it was a shock to me to wake up
and find that I was any place but across the
street." ( R. 49-51) .
5
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On cross-examination plaintiff testified to these
events as follows:
''Q. As I take it then, you checked these
cars and saw them to be down the streetA. Yes sir.
Q. - two blocks? And you walked
across the first lane of traffic on the west
side of the street without ever looking to the
south ag.ain?
A. The last I remember was just plain
walking.
THE COURT: Now just answer his
question.
Q. Just answer my question. You started on the west side of the street, crossing the
street towards the Mars Service Station and
you walked across the first lane and you never
looked to the south while you were doing that?
A. I cannot say I did not look, but I cannot say I didn't.
Q. The last thing you did before you
started across was to look at the traffic because you saw the cars two blocks away?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Now as you were crossing the street
did you ever look to the north again, as you
were crossing the street?
A. This is what I do not remember.
Q. There were no cars coming fron1 the
north, is that right?
A. That's right.
6
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Q. So according to the be best of your
recollection then, you walked from the west
~ide of Second West Street completely across
the west side of the road, ·completely across
the center lane and completely across two lanes
of traffic without ever looking to the south?
A. I did not say I didn't look. I don't
remember. The last I remember was just plain
walking.
Q. I know. But the best of your recollection is you did this without again looking to
the south?

A.

I have no recollection.

Q. Well, that is what I am getting at.
You remember being in an accident?

A. I remember waking tlp. I don't retnember the impact.
Q. All right. You remember waking up.
Do you remember being there at the scene of
the accident?

A.

Yes sir.

Q. Do you remember what you did before you started across the street?

A. Yes sir.
Q.
looking
A.
Q.
yard?
A.

You remember going out there and
at the sign with Beck Street on it?
Yes sir.
You remember getting stuck in the
Yes sir.
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Q. You remember there was a Mar~
Service Station across the street?
A. Oh yes.
Q. So that your recollection concerning
the facts of this accident are good, are they
not?
A. Yes." (R. 76-77).
While it appears from the evidence that plaintiff had a distinct recollection of all events imnlediately preceding the collision, including a memory
of the approxin1ate point on the roadway where the
accident occurred, she did not recollect looking to the
south for traffic after she left the west shoulder of
Beck Street and started walking east. From plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (map of Beck Street) we learn that
she ttaversed approximately 100 feet across six traffic lanes and an island. For this distance either she
did not look to the south for traffic again or if she
did look, failed to heed th1at which was clearly there
to be seen. Granting plaintiff the right to have the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to her,
this conclusion is still inescapable.
The other evidence of plaintiff consisted of an
expert who would have testified that the defendant
was traveling forty-five miles per hour immediately
before the accident ( R. 115) and a traffic engineer
who testified that the average person will walk at
the rate of approximately 4.5 to 5 feet per second
(R. 109).
In addition Mr. Palmer L. Arnesen who oper8
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atPd the "M·ars" Station testified concerning the
road conditions, landm·arks, and lighting in the area
(R. 23 through 37). Dr. Robert Earl Morrow, plain-

tiff's physician, testified concerning her injurie'S (R.
82).

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MAT..
TER OF LAW AND SUCH NEGLIGENCE
PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE ACCIDENT.
The lower court in this case dismissed the Com..
plaint of plaintiff at the conclusion of her evidence
and based its dismissal on the finding that plaintiff
"either (a) Failed to maintain a reasonable and
proper lookout for the defendant's automobile or (b)
Having observed said automobile, failed to yield the
right of way to the defendant's vehicle."
Appellant correctly states in her Brief that in
view of dismissal, the evidence, and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to her. The Respondent
agrees that this is a correct statement of the law.
Appellant claims that she had a right to cross
Beck Street at this point because there was no cross..
walk available within 700 feet. She also correctly
points out that she had a duty to exercise due care
and caution and a duty to yield the right of way to
all vehicular traffic.
Appellant then argues that the facts and circumstances of this case do not unerringly point to
the conclusion that she was guilty of negligence as
a matter of law, but on the contrary that the facts
and circumstances of the accident show that reasonable minds could differ on this point. Nowhere in
her Brief, however, does Appellant point out those
10
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facts or evidence upon which a jury cauld conclude
that she was in the exercise of due care. As a matter
of fact, there is no substantial dispute in the evidence. All of the testimony concerning the plaintiff's
due care or the lack of it came from her. We find in
reviewing her testimony that she stopped on the west
side of Beck Street directly across from the south
driveway of the HMars" Station ·and looked for traffic both north and south. She observed no traffic
approaching from the north and in looking south
observed two cars .approximately two blocks away.
She could only see the headlights of these cars and
concluded thereby that they were travelling approximately 20 n1. p.h. ( R. 47). She felt that there was no
problem and started walking across the street. ( R
50) She then proceeded approximately 100 feet
across the street .and was struck in the outside lane
of three northbound lanes.
Appellant did not remember whether she thereafter looked for traffic between the time she left her
position of safety on the west side of Beck Street and
the point of collision. (R. 76) Significantly, however, she did remember that the accident occurred
in the outside of three northbound traffic lanes (R.
51) and remembers walking from the west side of
Beck Street to the point of collision. (R. 80) She
remembers being at the scene of the accident (R.
77) and she remembered wh.at she did before she
started to cross the street. She testified extensively
on cross-examination concerning her recollection of
ll
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the events of the accident and concluded as follows:
"Q. So that your recollection concerning the facts of this accident are good, are
they not?"
''A. Yes." (R. '77)
The only two things that plaintiff did not remember
concerning the accident was the actual moment of
impact and whether she had looked to the south at
any time after she left the west side of Beck Street
and started walking across the highway.
It is understandable that .a person would have
no memory concerning the actual moment of a collision. This is a recognized medical phenomena and
was testified to by Dr. Morrow. (R. 104) But it is
not usual for a person to forget or be unable to
recollect certain events concerning an accident and
recollect others.
Dr. Morrow testified that plaintiff was unable
to recall the actual event of the accident. (R. 88)
Without referring specifically to plaintiff, Dr. Morrow testified in response to questions from the Court
as follows concerning this medical phenomena:
"The Court: The lapse of memory continues only for .a short time?
A. Yes Sir.
Q. And after a short time, they should
remember?
A. Yes Sir. But they only forget for a
short period of time. They may not ever remember seeing a car come upon them. The
12
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first thing they remember is that they have
had the accident. They don't remember how it
happened. They haYe only had a short lapse
of memory." (R. 89)
Plaintiff asks th.at we accept her testimony that
she had no rnernory or recollection wh,atever of having looked to the south for approaching traffic after
she left the west side of Beck Street. Assuming that
this testimony is correct, she then advances the proposition that since she has no memory one way or
another on this point, that she is entitled to .a legal
presun1ption; namely, that she was in the exercise
of due care and that we must, therefore, conclude
that she was maintaining a proper lookout. She
argues further that in the absence of a preponderance to the evidence to the contr.ary that this is
sufficient to carry a verdict in her favor.
The so called "presumption of due care" is
sin1 ply not applicable in this case. First of all, in
each case cited by Appellant where the presumption
has been discussed the case is one of wrongful death.
Plaintiff cites no case from this jurisdiction in support of her argument that the presumption should
apply to a case of simple lapse of memory. In the
case of J!echam v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d
285. the rule is stated to be as follows:
''From the basic fact that a human being
was accidentally killed, a presumption .arises
which requires the tryer of the facts to assume
the presumed facts, that decedent used due
care for his own safety, in the absence of a
prima facie showing to the contrary, but in
13
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this kind of a presumption upon the making
of such showing, the presumption disappears
from and becomes wholly inoperative in the
case, and the trial from then on should proceed exactly the same as through no presumption ever existed, or had any effect on the
case."
The Court then points out in Mecham v. Allen,
supra, that "Such a presumption deals only with the
burden of going forward with or the production of
evidence." In a wrongful death case, there is a reason for the rule. Ordinarily there is little evidence
as to how the accident actually happened and it is
thought desirable to place the burden of producing
evidence on the defendant.
Appellant, however, is asking this Court to extend the application of this presumption to a case
where the plaintiff is alive and testified and merely
had a lapse of memory concerning one fiact in the
case. An extension such as is contended for by
Appellant would open the door to .a great mischief.
As a matter of common knowledge, it is seldom that
a participant in an accident can remember all the
details that created or led to the situation or completely recollect all of their actions immediately preceding an accident. Nonetheless a party with a faulty
recollection would be entitled to have his case submitted to a jury in n1any instances. For instance, a
party who did not recollect whether or not he stopped
for a stop sign would be entitled to have a jury find
14
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that he did stop because those in the exercise of due
carP, do stop. A party who could not recollect his
degree of speerl would be entitled to have a jury find
that it was reasonable because those in the exercise
of due care travel at a reasonable speed. Many more
illustrations could, of course, be set forth. We point
these out to show that in such a situation, it would
alway~ be incun1hent upon a defendant to produce a
pritna facie case of contributory negligence. A Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's case
\vould become archaic in a negligence action and the
trial of such action would become grossly unfair to
a defendant.
While the presumption of due care has been
referred to above, it has been argued simply because
it was raised in Appellant's Brief and not because
Respondent believes it is material to this case. Respondent's position is that plaintiff's own testimony
and other evidence clearly show that she was negligent as a matter of law and that such negligence
proximately contributed to the accident and her injuries. The presumption, if it existed at all, disappears from the case upon the production of the
eYidence by either party.
We further add that whether plaintiff remembers looking to the south or not, the mere fact that
she walked approximately 100 feet across the high\\ay and walked directly in front of one of the two
approaching automobiles evidences in and of itself
that she either did not look or having looked, failed
15
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to heed and yield the right of way to defendant's
automobile.
Plaintiff testified that she stopped on the west
side of Beck Street directly across from the Mars
Service Station and looked for traffic both ways. She
observed two cars approaching from the south, but
none from the north. She then crossed the highway
to the point of the accident in the outside lane of the
three northbound lanes, a distance from the west
side of Beck Street of approximately 100 feet without any recollection of again looking to the south.
She was walking fast (R. 105) and continued in this
manner to the place where the accident occurred
(R. 50- 51). She did not stop or pause in the jsland
or elsewhere on the highway, but conceded that she
could have stopped in the inside lane of the three
northbound lanes and avoided the two approaching
vehicles which she had previously observed in the
center lane and outside lane (R. 81). Mter Plaintiff
left the west side of Beck Street, it is quite obvious
that she thereafter took no precautions whatever to
protect herself from what must have been a more
and more apparent danger.
In similar cases, this Court has concluded that
such conduct is negligence as .a matter of law.. In the
case of Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d
495, a pedestrian was killed in an accident that
occurred at the intersection of Westminster Avenue
and 1300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Court
assumed that the pedestrian was in an unmarked
16
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cross\valk. However, the crucial question in the case
\vas whether decedent failerl to keep a proper lookout
for approaching traffic. The Court concluded that
the pedestrian was guilty of negligence as a matter
of law and stated its reasons therefor as follows:
"More convincing than the direct testimony that deceased did not look, is the further
evidence that deceased neither said nor did
anything to indicate that he was at all aware
of the danger presented by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems to have been
\vholly unaware of its approach. Certainly he
did nothing either to warn his wife, nor to
rescue either himself or her from their position of peril. On this evidence, it must be said
as a matter of law that deceased either failed
to look, or having looked, failed to see what
he should have seen.
". . . Of course we do not mean to i1nply
that a mere glance in the direction of the approaching automobile would suffice. The duty
to look has inherent in it the duty to see what
is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it."
A very similar case factually to this case is the
case of Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P. 2d
1047. This was a wrongful death case involving an
automobile-pedestrian accident that occurred on the
main highway in Orem, Utah. There were six lanes
for moving traffic on this highway and they were
separated by double yellow lines. The decedent pedestrian had left a cafe on the west side of the highway
stating that he was going home and had crossed to
the east side of the highway when his wife called to
17
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him to return. He turned around and was walking
back to the west side of the highway when he was
struck by the vehicle of the defendant. No witness
actually observed the accident occur. A directed verdict was entered for defendant on the grounds that
decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. In that case as in the case .at bar, Appellant
urged a reversal on the following grounds : ( 1) The
trial Court erred in finding decedent contributorily
negligent as a matter of law because (a) Decedent
is presumed to have been acting with due care and
such presumption was not overcome and (b) Decedent's contributory negligence was a question of fact
improperly withheld from the jury. Appellant also
urged that assuming decedent was guilty of negligence, the question of whether his negligence proximately contributed to his death was a question of
fact erroneously withheld from the jury.
The Court in that case upheld the ruling of the
lower court and stated:
"On the evidence set forth the trial court
correctly found decedent contributorily negligent as a matter of law. From a fair appraisal
of the evidence reasonable men can draw but
one inference and that inference points unerringly to the negligence of the decedent. In
response to a call from his wife, decedent who
was walking east across a poorly lit highway.
turned and walked directly into the path of
defendant's automobile. Crossing a highway
at a point where there was no marked cross
walk, decedent was duty bound to yield the
18
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right of way to a vehicle upon the roadway.
See 41-6-79 Utah Code Annotated 1953. This
he failed to do. He, in addition, apparen_tly
failed to look, or having looked failed to see
what he should have seen and paid heed to it.
He sairl nothing and did nothing which indicated he was in any way aware of the danger
presented. Decedent was properly found negligent as a matter of law."
As to the issue of proximate cause, the Court
stated:
"Decedent's negligence was a 'proximate' or 'legal' cause of his death. Generally
speaking, the proximate cause of an injury is
the primary moving cause without which it
would not have been inflicted, but which, in
the natural and probable sequence of events,
and without the intervention of any new or
independent cause, produces the injury....
"If decedent had yielded the right of way
to defendant's automobile, or if he had looked
up the road and seen the approaching car and
paid heed to the danger which it presented,
the accident would never have happened. It is
patent that the negligence of the decedent was
a substantial factor in bringing about his
death."
The parties in this case are in complete agreement as to the legal duty on Plaintiff. On Page 15
of Appellant's Brief, she states that her duty was to
look and to continue to look and on Page 9 of her
Brief, she states that she had the duty to yield to all
Yehicular traffic. Her evidence clearly shows that
she did neither. As she started walking fast across
19
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the highway, she either failed to look or having
looked, she failed to yield the right of way. In either
event, she is negligent as a matter of law.
Another Utah case in point is Smith vs. Bennett,
1 Utah 2d 224, 265 P. 2d 401. In this case a pedestrian was struck by a vehicle outside of a marked
crosswalk on Second South Street west of 800 West
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. A directed verdict
for defendant was affirmed on appeal. Except as to
the proximity of defendant's automobile to plaintiff
.at the time she attempted to cross the traffic lanes,
there was no substantial dispute in the evidence.
The Court observed:
"Plaintiff chose to leave her preferred
position as a pedestrian within a marked
crosswalk and proceeded to walk down the
center of a heavily traveled street. She placed
herself in a position of peril. S.ant v. Miller,
115 Utah 559, 206 P. 2d 719. By attempting
to cross the street in disregard of safety rules,
she was charged with a high standard of care,
the duty being con1mensurate with the perilous circumstances. All reasonable men must
conclude that plaintiff by her conduct did not
discharge the duty placed upon her... '.
· "In the instant case there was but one demand upon plaintiff's attention. There is no
room for a reasonable difference of opinion as
to where her attention should have been concentrated; it was incumbent upon her to o.bserve the condition of approachin~ tra~f1~.
Th.at she failed to use due care in doing so 1t IS
manifest from the evidence."
20
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Plaintiff also argues that she had rio duty to
anticipate that defendant would disobey the law. She
argues that a speed limit in this area was 25 m.p.h..
and that defendant was traveling 45 m.p.h at the
time of the accident. While the negligence of defendant or the lack of it is not an issue on this appeal, we
meet the argument of plaintiff because the record
does not support her conclusion that the speed limit
was 25 mp.h.
Mr. Palmer Arnesen testified for plaintiff in
regard to the speed limit. He managed the "Mars"
Station and also another station in Salt Lake City.
He custon1arily journeyed between the two stations
during the day and to do so would leave the "Mars"
Station and travel north on Beck Street to the 'Covey
Station where he would turn aroun·d to travel south.
I-Ie stated that on the west side of Beck Street there
\vas a construction speed sign which indicated 25
n1.p.h. Sometin1es this sign was covered with ·a sheet
of burlap and sometim·es not. The purpose was to
slow traffic during the time con·struction was ~ctu
ally in progress ( R. 28 - 29 - 30 - 3'1 - 33) .
He testified further that .at the time of the accident, the highway had received its first coat of black
top and that there was nothing in the highway which
would limit or impede the speed of vehicles. He testified further that the speed limit along Beck Street
was ordinarily 50 m. p.h ( R. 35 - 36) .
This sign upon which plaintiff places so much
stress was for southbound traffic. The evidence as
1
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to speed for the northbound traffic (the direction

of defendant's automobile) is that the speed limit
was 50 m.p.h. ( R. 36). Plaintiff offered no evidence
whatsoever to show any speed restriction as to northbound traffic. Her evidence that defendant was
travelling 45 m.p.h. at the time of the accident is
insufficient to show any breach of duty by defendant.
A statement from the auto-pedestrian case of
Sant vs. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 P. 2d 719, wherein a directed verdict in favor of the motorist was
upheld, is pertinent in this regard. The Court stated:
"He was required to anticipate that vehicles move at different rates of speed; that
the slower moving automobiles are required to
drive on the right-hand side of their appropriate portion of the highway and faster moving vehicles pass to their left; that the faster
moving vehicles may not continue in a direct
line but may turn out from a straight formation to go around a slower moving car; and
that such movements may be made by reasonably safe drivers if they do not know or have
reason to be charged with knowledge that
pedestrians will be in danger by such movements."
In this case, appellant was charged with the
knowledge that vehicles do not continue to move at
the same rate of speed nor do they continue to stay
in the same lane of travel. For this, among other
reasons, appellant was required to maintain a proper
lookout for her own safety and to yield the right of
way to vehicular traffic.
22
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case and all inferences tc
be drawn therefrom unerringly points to but one
conclusion: That plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout for vehicles upon the highway. She
either saw the vehicles and then failed to take any
precautions for her own safety or she failed to see
and heed what was an ever increasing danger to
herself. Upon this ground, the Court properly ruled
that she was negligent as a matter of law and dismissed her action.
The Judgment of the lower Court must be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
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